18:01:31 #startmeeting tor-browser 18:01:31 Meeting started Mon Aug 15 18:01:31 2016 UTC. The chair is GeKo. Information about MeetBot at http://wiki.debian.org/MeetBot. 18:01:31 Useful Commands: #action #agreed #help #info #idea #link #topic. 18:01:41 hi all and welcome to another meeting. 18:02:08 who wants to go first today? 18:03:47 * mcs can give a report 18:04:04 Last week, Kathy and I developed patches for #17858, #19336, and #19906. 18:04:11 We also worked on #19733 (we posted a patch for that bug earlier today). 18:04:17 We started on #15852 but still have some more work to do. 18:04:24 This week we plan continue with #15852 and then start working on #14271 and/or #14272. 18:04:33 We may also look at #19646 again since that is a TB 6.0 regression for which we are responsible. 18:04:37 That’s all for now. 18:04:58 Oh, and thanks to GeKo for reviewing and merging things. 18:05:25 those were the more joyful things for me this week :) 18:05:34 :) 18:06:05 okay, here is what i did: 18:06:20 i spents some time looking at #19856 and #19857 18:06:46 the most time i was busy wwith dealing with #19890 which is quite nasty 18:07:07 i prepared 6.0.4 and hope to get it our tomorrow 18:07:40 it will basically contain the new stable tor and a fix for that bug on our side (mozilla helped a lot with the server side) 18:08:24 i worked on the design doc and sponsorU items regarding to the iSEC report 18:08:35 #19920 is one of the results 18:09:07 i prepared the release notes for 6.0.4 https://blog.torproject.org/blog/tor-browser-604-released 18:09:15 and wold appreciate comments/changes if needed 18:09:46 finally i managed to get rid of my backlog, triaged tickets and looked over the blog comments 18:10:06 this week i hope 6.0.4 gets out and things start to slow down a bit again 18:10:47 i plan to get work done on the design document and remaining iSEC related sponsorU items. 18:10:55 that's it. 18:11:38 The 6.0.4 announcement looks OK to me. 18:12:40 thanks. 18:13:34 Looks good to me as well. 18:13:54 * arthuredelstein can go 18:14:03 Last week again I was largely afk. 18:14:22 But in my limited time I focused on #13018 and #13017. 18:14:52 I have confirmed what boklm saw, that libm can be used to mitigate both issues. 18:14:59 neat 18:15:15 And I nearly have a patch that integrates libm, but it's kinda a rabbit hole. 18:16:11 One option I think might work better is to include libm and similar libraries once we have containerized TBB. 18:16:35 But I'm hoping at least to have a prototype patch soon that we can test. 18:16:57 I also did some review of patches being uplifted to Mozilla. 18:17:38 This week I will be back to work, and I plan to do more such reviews, and look more at porting the resizing patch to the browser. 18:17:41 That's it for me. 18:18:43 which mozilla patches did you look at? there seems to be much work going on right now 18:18:58 (at least according to my bugzilla spam) 18:19:21 could you have a second look at #19706 as well? 18:19:38 Yes, mainly the isolation regression test framework patch 18:19:51 okay. 18:20:22 bugzil.la/1281319 18:20:44 Sure, I'll give #19706 a look 18:22:09 ah, you meant 1289319, okay. 18:22:18 whe else is here? 18:22:38 oops, you're right 18:22:41 boklm is on vacation but maybe others are at the meeting for questions, updates etc. 18:23:59 okay, i have one item on my discussio list 18:24:16 with the help of a user i looked at #19907 last week 18:24:29 and all we found was that the extension was okay 18:24:54 and that after copying it over manually again everything worked as expected. 18:25:16 this seems to leave a bug during the signature verification which we don't touch 18:25:39 i asked in mozilla's #security if they had similar reports but got no answer 18:26:03 i wonder what we should do at this stage. 18:26:28 i guess i can start looking at changesets on gecko-dev and see whether they fixed things meanwhile 18:26:37 and try to find related bugs 18:26:50 + file one in Mozilla's bug tracker 18:27:05 but this things makes me pretty nervous in general 18:27:08 We don’t really have steps to reproduce, or do we? 18:27:09 *thing 18:27:10 Is there a way we could repeatedly trigger the signature check and try to see the rare failure? 18:27:22 mcs: no we don't 18:27:41 good question. i don't know. 18:28:07 Were both reports on the same platform? 18:29:32 let me look. 18:30:42 one on ubuntu the other on windows 8 18:31:49 i am wondering whether we should disable this verification until those things get investigated and fixed. 18:32:41 It might make sense to disable the checks. We could also try to reproduce it by repeatedly triggering the sig check (as Arthur suggested). 18:32:52 You know that the xpi was good? 18:33:14 yes. i got it uploaded and the hash was the expected one 18:33:54 okay, this is something to mull over i guess for the next regular release at least. 18:34:20 help (with smart ideas etc.) would be appreciated :) 18:34:37 anything else up for discussion? 18:35:06 GeKo: Did you get the error message (for #19907)? 18:35:27 Would maybe be helpful to work out the code path. 18:35:34 no, alas not. i tried hard on different systems but failed so far :( 18:35:50 yes. 18:36:56 I wonder how often sigs are checked. 18:37:14 it seems only on install 18:37:25 which would be another thing to look at 18:37:44 maybe we could trigger checking it every time. 18:37:57 maybe it is already that way (would make more sense i guess) 18:38:13 but then the noscript failure would be weird. 18:38:27 and i did not see anything in the debug log in this regard from the user 18:39:27 we managed to copy the malfunctioning tor browser and enable "extensions.logging.enabled" and no rechecking was visible 18:39:44 It seems like a lot of Firefox users would be affected (just based on the odds of someone running into even a rare bug). Unless the bug only occurs in Tor Browser. 18:40:30 that is a good point. on the other hand maybe it is PBM related or due to some other non-vanilla thing we do 18:40:30 (Is this a good time for me to ask if I need to do more with the content policy stuff) 18:40:40 yes 18:40:50 "Do I need to do more with the content policy stuff" 18:40:53 ? 18:41:12 i've been thinking about that and came up with two options: 18:41:26 1) back out your patches and declare defeat so far 18:41:44 2) whitelist the urls and try to find out what else breaks 18:42:04 I have a branch that whitelists stuff 18:42:08 that's not public 18:42:09 i am not sure yet how promising 2) is 18:42:19 it fixed everything that people complained about 18:42:28 dunno 18:42:46 being able to slurp preferences etc via resource:// is really bad 18:42:52 so I'd opt for 2 18:43:01 We could blacklist preference files instead I suppose 18:43:05 even if it's imperfect (evil can slurp the whitelisted urls) 18:43:51 arthuredelstein: that screws people that bolt on non-standard addons 18:43:59 among other things 18:44:07 arthuredelstein: maybe! 18:44:13 Yawning: true 18:44:52 So maybe a big whitelist that covers all harmless URLs is best? 18:45:02 so basically the lsit I posted? 18:45:13 I don't think we change any of those files 18:45:25 but by virtue of the whtielist existing people can tell taht the browser is tor browsr 18:45:37 Yes, does that cover all the chrome/resource URLs? 18:45:40 and if upstream changes stuff inbetween versions, it leaks versioning (probably ok?) 18:45:52 yes 18:45:53 it covers all of the ones that people have reported as breaking 18:46:08 i suspect the chances of version leaking are not that big 18:46:11 We don't hide that the browser is Tor Browser anyway 18:46:19 and that 18:46:29 Also versions are probably also impossible to hide from a determined adversary 18:46:43 Unless we never make improvements ;) 18:46:46 so 18:46:49 so, yes, 2) might be a think to consider for the next alpha 18:46:51 my suggestion 18:46:52 *thing 18:46:58 I publish my branch 18:47:03 that fixes the known stuff that breaks 18:47:06 we mrege that 18:47:15 and see what else if anything breaks horribly 18:47:26 yes, sounds good to me 18:47:35 rome URLs to whitelist 18:47:46 er, let me try again. 18:47:58 I was thinking we could maybe add all chrome URLs to whitelist, except dangerous ones. 18:48:08 So we don't have to wait for something to break. 18:49:25 hm. i have not looked but it seems to like this is quite some effort + resource:/// things 18:49:38 (determining the dangerousness) 18:50:02 s/seems to/seems/ 18:50:07 hm 18:50:09 but 18:50:14 firefox loads both resource and chrome urls 18:50:18 for certain things 18:50:21 it's stupid as hell 18:51:04 I should have said chrome and resource URLs. 18:51:22 I put a list in trac? 18:51:25 I was more or less assuming only the pref files are dangerous 18:51:32 aha! 18:51:37 And addons, too. 18:52:05 but i bet there are platform specific versions of some resource and chrome urls available 18:52:10 https://git.schwanenlied.me/yawning/torbutton/commit/4405f2cda9e39e3425ba4c027c933e07b7098bb2 18:52:17 oh derp 18:52:23 True, I guess it's a case of whether we are trying to hide the platform. 18:52:24 I need to remove a dump() 18:52:39 So far I have tended to assume we aren't as it is nearly impossible anyway. 18:52:56 right 18:53:38 *force pushes* 18:53:45 Anyhow, I'm also OK with the "see what breaks" approach, as probably little is broken. 18:53:55 https://git.schwanenlied.me/yawning/torbutton/commit/eb7ad18e69e629e1229fe78a71b2f58e651fdf62 18:54:02 something like that 18:54:11 has fixed everything I am awayre of that's broken 18:54:49 it matches by URL and load type 18:55:12 cool. we can think about this some more but i guess taking your patch for the next alpha seems like a good idea. 18:55:25 thanks for doing that, yawning 18:55:33 I've had that sitting around 18:55:38 since the day the bug was reported 18:55:39 >.> 18:55:42 i can feel your pain fwiw :) 18:55:43 Do we want to place it behind a pref so people can disable it if something breaks? 18:56:02 (I think Yawning mentioned that idea in the code or ticket) 18:56:06 Dunno how people want to handle 18:56:16 gaping fingerprinting attacks 18:56:18 i tend to say, "no" 18:56:19 vs stuff breaking 18:56:35 OK. We can just deal with problems if they come up then 18:56:43 could tie the whitelist to the slider so the extra paranoid can deal with broken stuff 18:56:48 this is alpha quality and the pref makes it so that if we need to test more those users are note exposed to the feature anymore 18:57:20 We know for sure that the pref files should be blacklisted in any case. 18:57:31 So we don't want to offer a pref to whitelist that part. 18:57:51 *not exposed 18:58:13 was thinking like "enable the pref to break the video player, because if you trust the codec to not be full of holes, you're kind of nuts" 18:58:32 but people will prolly complain 18:58:45 commented on trac with the branch 18:58:48 they did :) 18:59:08 okay, let's wrap up. anything else for today? 18:59:57 thanks for the meeting then, *baf* 19:00:00 #endmeeting